Later on the day of the Afghanistan briefing, Bannon heard about yet another harebrained
Jarvanka scheme. They planned to hire Anthony Scaramucci, aka “the Mooch.”
After Trump had clinched the nomination more than a year before, Scaramucci—a hedge
funder and go-to Trump surrogate for cable business news (mostly Fox Business Channel)—had
become a reliable presence at Trump Tower. But then, in the last month of the campaign, with
polls predicting a humiliating Trump defeat, he was suddenly nowhere to be seen. The question
“Where’s the Mooch?” seemed to be just one more indicator of the campaign’s certain and
pitiless end.
But on the day after the election, Steve Bannon—soon to be named chief strategist for the forty-fifth president-elect—was greeted as he arrived midmorning in Trump Tower by Anthony Scaramucci, holding a Starbucks coffee for him.
Over the next three months, Scaramucci, although no longer needed as a surrogate and without anything else particularly to do, became a constant hovering—or even lurking—presence at Trump Tower. Ever unflagging, he interrupted a meeting in Kellyanne Conway’s office in early January just to make sure she knew that her husband’s firm, Wachtell, Lipton, was representing him. Having made that point, name-dropping and vastly praising the firm’s key partners, he then helped himself to a chair in Conway’s meeting and, for both Conway’s and her visitor’s benefit, offered a stirring testimonial to the uniqueness and sagacity of Donald Trump and the workingclass people—speaking of which, he took the opportunity to provide a résumé of his own Long Island working-class bona fides—who had elected him.
Scaramucci was hardly the only hanger-on and job seeker in the building, but his method was
among the most dogged. He spent his days looking for meetings to be invited into, or visitors to
engage with—this was easy because every other job seeker was looking for someone with whom
to chat it up, so he soon became something like the unofficial official greeter. Whenever
possible, he would grab a few minutes with any senior staffer who would not rebuff him. As he
waited to be offered a high White House position, he was, he seemed personally certain,
reaffirming his loyalty and team spirit and unique energy. He was so confident about his future
that he made a deal to sell his hedge fund, Skybridge Capital, to HNA Group, the Chinese
megaconglomerate.
Political campaigns, substantially based on volunteer help, attract a range of silly, needy, and opportunistic figures. The Trump campaign perhaps scraped lower in the barrel than most. The Mooch, for one, might not have been the most peculiar volunteer in the Trump run for president, but many figured him to be among the most shameless.
It was not just that before he became a dedicated supporter of Donald Trump, he was a
dedicated naysayer, or that he had once been an Obama and Hillary Clinton supporter. The
problem was that, really, nobody liked him. Even for someone in politics, he was immodest and
incorrigible, and followed by a trail of self-serving and often contradictory statements made to
this person about that person, which invariably made it back to whatever person was being most
negatively talked about.
He was not merely a shameless self-promoter; he was a proud self-promoter. He was, by his
own account, a fantastic networker. (This boast was surely true, since Skybridge Capital was a
fund of funds, which is less a matter of investment acumen than of knowing top fund managers
and being able to invest with them.) He had paid as much as half a million dollars to have his
firm’s logo appear in the movie Wall Street 2 and to buy himself a cameo part in the film. He ran
a yearly conference for hedge funders at which he himself was the star. He had a television gig at
Fox Business Channel. He was a famous partier every year at Davos, once exuberantly dancing
alongside the son of Muammar Gaddafi.
As for the presidential campaign, when signing on with Donald Trump—after he had bet big against Trump—he billed himself as a version of Trump, and he saw the two of them as a new kind of showman and communicator set to transform politics.
Although his persistence and his constant on-the-spot personal lobbying might not have endeared him to anybody, it did prompt the “What to do with Scaramucci?” question, which somehow came to beg an answer. Priebus, trying to deal with the Mooch problem and dispose of him at the same time, suggested that he take a money-raising job as finance director of the RNC —an offer Scaramucci rebuffed in a blowup in Trump Tower, loudly bad-mouthing Priebus in vivid language, a mere preview of what was to come.
While he wanted a job with the Trump administration, the Mooch specifically wanted one of
the jobs that would give him a tax break on the sale of his business. A federal program provides
for deferred payment of capital gains in the event of a sale of property to meet ethical
requirements. Scaramucci needed a job that would get him a “certificate of divestiture,” which is
what an envious Scaramucci knew Gary Cohn had received for the sale of his Goldman stock.
A week before the inaugural he was finally offered such a job: director of the White House Office of Public Engagement and Intergovernmental Affairs. He would be the president’s representative and cheerleader before Trump-partial interest groups.
But the White House ethics office balked—the sale of his business would take months to
complete and he would be directly negotiating with an entity that was at least in part controlled
by the Chinese government. And because Scaramucci had little support from anybody else, he
was effectively blocked. It was, a resentful Scaramucci noted, one of the few instances in the
Trump government when someone’s business conflicts interfered with a White House
appointment.
And yet with a salesman’s tenacity, the Mooch pressed on. He appointed himself a Trump
ambassador without portfolio. He declared himself Trump’s man on Wall Street, even if,
practically speaking, he wasn’t a Trump man and he was exiting his firm on Wall Street. He was
also in constant touch with anybody from the Trump circle who was willing to be in touch with
him.
The “What to do with the Mooch” question persisted. Kushner, with whom Scaramucci had exercised a rare restraint during the campaign, and who had steadily heard from other New York contacts about Scaramucci’s continued loyalty, helped push the question.
Priebus and others held Scaramucci at bay until June and then, as a bit of a punch line,
Scaramucci was offered and, degradingly, had to accept, being named senior vice president and
chief strategy officer for the U.S. Export-Import Bank, an executive branch agency Trump had
long vowed to eliminate. But the Mooch was not ready to give up the fight: after yet more
lobbying, he was offered, at Bannon’s instigation, the post of ambassador to the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development. The job came with a twenty-room apartment on the
Seine, a full staff, and—Bannon found this part particularly amusing—absolutely no influence or responsibilities.
* * *
Meanwhile, another persistent question, “What to do with Spicer,” seemed to somehow have been joined to the disaster involving the bungled response to the news of the June 2016 meeting between Don Jr., Jared, and the Russians. Since the president, while traveling on Air Force One, had actually dictated Don Jr.’s response to the initial Times report about the meeting, the blame for this should have been laid at the feet of Trump and Hope Hicks: Trump dictated, Hicks transcribed. But because no disasters could be laid at the president’s feet, Hicks herself was spared. And, even though he had been pointedly excluded from the Trump Tower crisis, the blame for the episode was now put at Spicer’s feet, precisely because, his loyalty in doubt, he and the communications staff had to be excluded.
In this, the comms team was judged to be antagonistic if not hostile to the interests of Jared
and Ivanka; Spicer and his people had failed to mount an inclusive defense for them, nor had the
comms team adequately defended the White House. This of course homed in on the essential and
obvious point: although the junior first couple were mere staffers and not part of the institutional
standing of the White House, they thought and acted as if they were part of the presidential
entity. Their ire and increasing bitterness came from some of the staff’s reluctance—really, a
deep and intensifying resistance—to treat them as part and parcel of the presidency. (Once
Priebus had to take Ivanka aside to make sure she understood that in her official role, she was
just a staffer. Ivanka had insisted on the distinction that she was a staffer-slash-First Daughter.)
Bannon was their public enemy; they expected nothing of him. But Priebus and Spicer they regarded as functionaries, and their job was to support the White House’s goals, which included their goals and interests.
Spicer, ever ridiculed in the media for his cockamamie defense of the White House and a seeming dumb loyalty, had been judged by the president, quite from the inauguration, to be not loyal enough and not nearly as aggressive as he should be in Trump’s defense. Or, in Jared and Ivanka’s view, in his family’s defense. “What does Spicer’s forty-member comm staff actually do?” was a persistent First Family question.
* * *
Almost from the beginning, the president had been interviewing potential new press secretaries.
He appeared to have offered the job to various people, one of whom was Kimberly Guilfoyle, the
Fox News personality and cohost of The Five. Guilfoyle, the former wife of California Democrat
Gavin Newsom, was also reported to be Anthony Scaramucci’s girlfriend, a rumor he denied.
Unbeknownst to the White House, Scaramucci’s personal life was in dramatic free fall. On July
9, nine months pregnant with their second child, Scaramucci’s wife filed for divorce.
Guilfoyle, knowing that Spicer was on his way out but having decided not to take his job—or, according to others in the White House, never having been offered it—suggested Scaramucci, who set to work convincing Jared and Ivanka that theirs was largely a PR problem and that they were ill served by the current communications team.
Scaramucci called a reporter he knew to urge that an upcoming story about Kushner’s Russian
contacts be spiked. He followed up by having another mutual contact call the reporter to say that
if the story was spiked it would help the Mooch get into the White House, whereupon the
reporter would have special Mooch access. The Mooch then assured Jared and Ivanka that he had, in this clever way, killed the story.
Now Scaramucci had their attention. We need some new thinking, the couple thought; we need somebody who is more on our side. The fact that Scaramucci was from New York, and Wall Street, and was rich, reassured them that he understood what the deal was. And that he would understand the stakes and know that an aggressive game needed to be played.
On the other hand, the couple did not want to be perceived as being heavy-handed. So, after bitterly accusing Spicer of not defending them adequately, they suddenly backed off and suggested that they were just looking to add a new voice to the mix. The job of White House communications director, which had no precise purview, had been vacant since May, when Mike Dubke, whose presence at the White House had hardly registered, resigned. Scaramucci could take this job, the couple figured, and in that role he could be their ally.
“He’s good on television,” Ivanka told Spicer when she explained the rationale for hiring a former hedge fund manager as White House communications director. “Maybe he can help us.” It was the president who, meeting with Scaramucci, was won over by the Mooch’s cringeworthy Wall Street hortatory flattery. (“I can only hope to realize a small part of your genius as a communicator, but you are my example and model” was one report of the gist of the Scaramucci supplication.) And it was Trump who then urged that Scaramucci become the true communications chief, reporting directly to the president.
On July 19, Jared and Ivanka, through intermediaries, put a feeler out to Bannon: What would he think about Scaramucci’s coming on board in the comms job?
So preposterous did this seem to Bannon—it was a cry of haplessness, and certain evidence that the couple had become truly desperate—that he refused to consider or even reply to the question. Now he was sure: Jarvanka was losing it.
21
BANNON AND SCARAMUCCI
Bannon’s apartment in Arlington, Virginia, a fifteen-minute drive from downtown Washington,
was called the “safe house.” This seemed somehow to acknowledge his transience and to nod,
with whatever irony, to the underground and even romantic nature of his politics—the roguish
and joie de guerre alt-right. Bannon had decamped here from the Breitbart Embassy on A Street
on Capitol Hill. It was a one-bedroom graduate-student sort of apartment, in a mixed-use
building over a mega-McDonald’s—quite belying Bannon’s rumored fortune—with five or six
hundred books (emphasis on popular history) stacked against the wall without benefit of
shelving. His lieutenant, Alexandra Preate, also lived in the building, as did the American lawyer
for Nigel Farage, the right-wing British Brexit leader who was part of the greater Breitbart circle.
On the evening on Thursday, July 20, the day after the contentious meeting about Afghanistan, Bannon was hosting a small dinner—organized by Preate, with Chinese takeout. Bannon was in an expansive, almost celebratory, mood. Still, Bannon knew, just when you felt on top of the world in the Trump administration, you could probably count on getting cut down. That was the pattern and price of one-man leadership—insecure-man leadership. The other biggest guy in the room always had to be reduced in size.
Many around him felt Bannon was going into another bad cycle. In his first run around the track, he’d been punished by the president for his Time magazine cover and for the Saturday Night Live portrayal of “President Bannon”—that cruelest of digs to Trump. Now there was a new book, The Devil’s Bargain, and it claimed, often in Bannon’s own words, that Trump could not have done it without him. The president was again greatly peeved.
Still, Bannon seemed to feel he had broken through. Whatever happened, he had clarity. It was
such a mess inside in the White House that, if nothing else, this clarity would put him on top. His
agenda was front and center, and his enemies sidelined. Jared and Ivanka were getting blown up
every day and were now wholly preoccupied with protecting themselves. Dina Powell was
looking for another job. McMaster had screwed himself on Afghanistan. Gary Cohn, once a
killer enemy, was now desperate to be named Fed chairman and currying favor with Bannon
—“licking my balls,” Bannon said with a quite a cackle. In return for supporting Cohn’s
campaign to win the Fed job, Bannon was extracting fealty from him for the right-wing trade
agenda.
The geniuses were fucked. Even POTUS might be fucked. But Bannon had the vision and the discipline—he was sure he did. “I’m cracking my shit every day. The nationalist agenda, we’re fucking owning it. I’ll be there for the duration.”
Before the dinner, Bannon had sent around an article from the Guardian—though one of the
leading English-language left-leaning newspapers, it was nevertheless Bannon’s favorite paper—
about the backlash to globalization. The article, by the liberal journalist Nikil Saval, both
accepted Bannon’s central populist political premise—“the competition between workers in
developing and developed countries . . . helped drive down wages and job security for workers in
developed countries”—and elevated it to the epochal fight of our time. Davos was dead and
Bannon was very much alive. “Economists who were once ardent proponents of globalization
have become some of its most prominent critics,” wrote Saval. “Erstwhile supporters now
concede, at least in part, that it has produced inequality, unemployment and downward pressure
on wages. Nuances and criticisms that economists only used to raise in private seminars are
finally coming out in the open.”
“I’m starting to get tired of winning” was all that Bannon said in his email with the link to the
article.
Now, restless and pacing, Bannon was recounting how Trump had dumped on McMaster and, as well, savoring the rolling-on-the-floor absurdity of the geniuses’ Scaramucci gambit. But most of all he was incredulous about something else that had happened the day before.
Unbeknownst to senior staff, or to the comms office—other than by way of a pro forma schedule note—the president had given a major interview to the New York Times. Jared and Ivanka, along with Hope Hicks, had set it up. The Times’s Maggie Haberman, Trump’s bête noire (“very mean, and not smart”) and yet his go-to journalist for some higher sort of approval, had been called in to see the president with her colleagues Peter Baker and Michael Schmidt. The result was one of the most peculiar and ill-advised interviews in presidential history, from a president who had already, several times before, achieved that milestone.
In the interview, Trump had done his daughter and son-in-law’s increasingly frantic bidding.
He had, even if to no clear end and without certain strategy, continued on his course of
threatening the attorney general for recusing himself and opening the door to a special
prosecutor. He openly pushed Sessions to resign—mocking and insulting him and daring him to
try to stay. However much this seemed to advance no one’s cause, except perhaps that of the
special prosecutor, Bannon’s incredulity—“Jefferson Beauregard Sessions is not going to go
anywhere”—was most keenly focused on another remarkable passage in the interview: the
president had admonished the special counsel not to cross the line into his family’s finances.
“Ehhh . . . ehhh . . . ehhh!” screeched Bannon, making the sound of an emergency alarm. “Don’t look here! Let’s tell a prosecutor what not to look at!”
Bannon then described the conversation he’d had with the president earlier that day: “I went
right into him and said, ‘Why did you say that?’ And he says, ‘The Sessions thing?’ and I say,
‘No, that’s bad, but it’s another day at the office.’ I said, ‘Why did you say it was off limits to go
after your family’s finances?’ And he says, ‘Well, it is……………. ’ I go, ‘Hey, they are going to
determine their mandate………. You may not like it, but you just guaranteed if you want to get
anybody else in [the special counsel] slot, every senator will make him swear that the first thing he’s going to do is come in and subpoena your fucking tax returns.’ ”
Bannon, with further disbelief, recounted the details of a recent story from the Financial Times
about Felix Sater, one of the shadiest of the shady Trump-associated characters, who was closely
aligned with Trump’s longtime personal lawyer, Michael Cohen (reportedly a target of the
Mueller investigation), and a key follow-the-money link to Russia. Sater, “get ready for it—I
know this may shock you, but wait for it”—had had major problems with the law before, “caught
with a couple of guys in Boca running Russian money through a boiler room.” And, it turns out,
“Brother Sater” was prosecuted by—“wait”—Andrew Weissmann. (Mueller had recently hired
Weissmann, a high-powered Washington lawyer who headed the DOJ’s criminal fraud division.) “You’ve got the LeBron James of money laundering investigations on you, Jarvanka. My asshole just got so tight!”
Bannon quite literally slapped his sides and then returned to his conversation with the president. “And he goes, ‘That’s not their mandate.’ Seriously, dude?”
Preate, putting out the Chinese food on a table, said, “It wasn’t their mandate to put Arthur Andersen out of business during Enron, but that didn’t stop Andrew Weissmann”—one of the Enron prosecutors.
“You realize where this is going,” Bannon continued. “This is all about money laundering. Mueller chose Weissmann first and he is a money laundering guy. Their path to fucking Trump goes right through Paul Manafort, Don Jr., and Jared Kushner . . . It’s as plain as a hair on your face It goes through all the Kushner shit. They’re going to roll those two guys up and say play me or trade me. But . . . ‘executive privilege!’ ” Bannon mimicked. “ ‘We’ve got executive privilege!’ There’s no executive privilege! We proved that in Watergate.”
An expressive man, Bannon seemed to have suddenly exhausted himself. After a pause, he
added wearily: “They’re sitting on a beach trying to stop a Category Five.”
With his hands in front of him, he mimed something like a force field that would isolate him
from danger. “It’s not my deal. He’s got the five geniuses around him: Jarvanka, Hope Hicks,
Dina Powell, and Josh Raffel.” He threw up his hands again, this time as if to say Hands off. “I
know no Russians, I don’t know nothin’ about nothin’. I’m not being a witness. I’m not hiring a
lawyer. It is not going to be my ass in front of a microphone on national TV answering questions.
Hope Hicks is so fucked she doesn’t even know it. They are going to lay her out. They’re going
to crack Don Junior like an egg on national TV. Michael Cohen, cracked like an egg. He”—the
president—“said to me everybody would take that Don Junior meeting with the Russians. I said,
‘Everybody would not take that meeting.’ I said, ‘I’m a naval officer. I’m not going to take a
meeting with Russian nationals, and do it in headquarters, are you fucking insane?’ and he says,
‘But he’s a good boy.’ There were no meetings like that after I took over the campaign.”
Bannon’s tone veered from ad absurdum desperation to resignation.
“If he fires Mueller it just brings the impeachment quicker. Why not, let’s do it. Let’s get it on.
Why not? What am I going to do? Am I going to go in and save him? He’s Donald Trump. He’s
always gonna do things. He wants an unrecused attorney general. I told him if Jeff Sessions goes,
Rod Rosenstein goes, and then Rachel Brand”—the associate attorney general, next in line after
Rosenstein—“goes, we’ll be digging down into Obama career guys. An Obama guy will be
acting attorney general. I said you’re not going to get Rudy”—Trump had again revived a wish
for his loyalists Rudy Giuliani or Chris Christie to take the job—“because he was on the
campaign and will have to recuse himself, and Chris Christie, too, so those are masturbatory
fantasies, get those out of your brain. And, for anybody to get confirmed now, they are going to
have to swear and ensure that things will go ahead and they won’t fire anybody, because you said
yesterday—Ehhh . . . ehhh…….. ehhh!—‘my family finances are off limits,’ and they’re going to
demand that, whoever he is, he promises and commits to make the family finances part of this
investigation. I told him as night follows day that’s a lock, so you better hope Sessions stays
around.”
“He was calling people in New York last night asking what he should do,” added Preate. (Almost everybody in the White House followed Trump’s thinking by tracking whom he had called the night before.)
Bannon sat back and, with steam-rising frustration—almost a cartoon figure—he outlined his